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The Oklahoma Supreme Court and the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals issued
a number of opinions during the past year that dealt with civil procedure. Two
Oklahoma Supreme Court decisions' were concerned with aspects of procedural due
process. There were also a number of cases2 involving statutes of limitations
including one case interpreting Oklahoma's savings statute,3 which allows therefiling
of an action dismissed other than on the merits. The Oklahoma Legislature, as well,
made two significant changes: first, by amending the statute governing interest on
judgments4 to clarify the calculation of interest when the interest rate changes from
one year to the next; second, it revised the subpoena duces tecum procedure for
document production by third parties.5 There were also several decisions concerning
attorney fees6 and interest7 under Oklahoma law.
In a remarkable pair of decisions relating to pleading,8 the Oklahoma Supreme
Court found the trial court abused its discretion by denying motions to dismiss for
failure to state a claim.9 The Oklahoma appellate courts also issued several
decisions" involving discovery issues. Although the courts did not articulate a
* Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law.
1. See Nelson v. Nelson, 954P.2d 1219 (Okla. 1998); PFL Life Ins. Co. v. Franklin, 958 P.2d 156 (Okla. 1998).
2. See Bruner v. Sobel, 961 P.2d 815 (Okla. 1998); Clements v. ONEOKResources Co., 946 P.2d 1154 (Okla.
1997); Cortright v. City of Oklahoma City, 951 P.2d 93 (Okla. 1997); Purcell v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 961 P.2d
188 (Okla. 1998); Hodge v. Morris, 945 P.2d 1047 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998); Garrison v. Wood, 957 P.2d 129 (Okla.
Ct. App.1998); Newton v. Newton, 956 P.2d 934 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998); Pettyjohn v. Plaster, 956 P.2d 948 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1998).
3. SeeOKA.STAT.fit. 12, § 100(1991).
4. See id. § 727 (Supp. 1998).
5. See id. § 2004.1 (Supp.1998).
6. See Midwest Livestock Sys. v. Lashley, 967 P.2d 1197 (Okla. 1998); Oneok, Inc. v. Ming, 962 P.2d 1286
(Okla. 1998); Alford v. Garzone, 964 P.2d 944 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998);
Ellison v. Florence, 954 P.2d 1255 (Okla. CL App. 1998); Fugate v. Mooney, 958 P.2d 818 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998);
Musser v. Musser, 955 P.2d 744 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998).
7. See Baker v. Barnes, 949 P.2d 695 (Okla. Ct. App. 1997).
8. See Brock v. Thompson, 948 P.2d 279 (Okla. 1997); Gaylord Entertainment Co. v. Thompson, 958 P.2d 128
(Okla. 1998).
9. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2012(B)(6) (1991) (governing motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which related can be granted).
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change in the legal standard for summary judgments, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
affirmed three summaryjudgments in slip and fall cases. " Thus, while the Oklahoma
Supreme Court has not adopted the federal standard for summary judgment from the
Celotexline of cases,' 2 the Supreme Court demonstrated that summary judgment may
be available in particular negligence cases where the proper showing is made. There
were also a number of cases' 3 involving the joinder of claims and parties including
three decisions dealing with the certification of class actions.14 In addition, there were
a number of cases that addressed various issues relating to trials, including the
impeachment of expert witnesses, 15 cross-examination of witnesses, the right tojury
trial in a civil forfeiture action, 17 peremptory challenges,' 8 and jury instructions.' 9
A procedural topic that received an exceptional amount of attention was claim
and issue preclusion, concerning which the Oklahoma Supreme Court issued seven
opinions, a record number.2" The Oklahoma Supreme Court also overruled two of
its decisions relating to civil procedure.2' One case concerned the application of
Oklahoma's dormancy statute to judgments from other states22 and the other
concerned the use of ordinary mail for the filing of an appeal.'
II. DUE PROCESS AND JURISDICTION
Procedural due process is a fundamental requirement of the United States and
Oklahoma Constitutions that the Oklahoma Supreme Court has rigorously enforced
10. See Floyd v. Ricks, 954 P.2d 131 (Okla. 1998); Hotels, Inc. v. Kampar Corp., 964 P.2d 933 (Okla. CL App.
1998); McCoy v. Black, 949 P.2d 689 (Okla. Ct. App. 1997).
11. See Pickens v. Tulsa Metro. Ministry, 951 P.2d 1079 (Okla. 1997); Weldon v. Dunn, 962 P.2d 1273 (Okla.
1998); Williams v. Tulsa Motels, 958 P.2d 1282 (Okla. 1998).
12. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986);
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
13. See Brandon vAshworth, 955 P.2d233 (Okla. 1998); Watsonv.Batton, 958P.2d812 (Okla. 1998); Liberty
Bank & Trust Co. v. Perimeter Ctr., Ltd. Partnership, 958 P.2d 814 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998); In re Estate of King, 955
P.2d 756 (Okla. Ct App. 1998); Metroplex Properties v. Oral Roberts Univ., 956 P.2d 926 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998).
14. See Black Hawk Oil Co. v.Exxon Corp., 969 P.2d 337 (Okla. 1998); Greghol Ltd.Partnership v. Oryx Energy
Co., 959 P.2d 596 (Okla. CL App. 1998); Mayo v. Kaiser-Francis Oil Co., 962 P.2d 657 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998).
15. See Holm-Waddlev.W illiam D. HawleyM.D., Inc., 967 P.2d 1180 (Okla. 1998); Mills v. Grotheer,957 P.2d
540 (Okla. 1998).
16. See McMinn v. City of Okla. City, 952 P.2d 517 (Okla. 1997).
17. See State ex reL Zimmerman v. One Black with Purple Trim Ford Flareside Truck, 960 P.2d 844 (Okla. CL
App. 1998).
18. See Rucker v. Mid Century Ins. Co., 945 P.2d 507 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998).
19. See Sullivan v. Forty-Second West Corp., 961 P.2d 801 (Okla. 1998).
20. See Danner v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 949 P.2d 680 (Okla. 1997); Deloney ex rel. Deloney v. Downey, 944 P.2d
312 (Okla. 1997); Hefley v. Neely Ins. Agency, 954P.2d 135 (Okla. 1998); Hesser v. Central Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.
of Enid, 956 P.2d 864 (Okla. 1998); In re Estate of Sneed, 953 P.2d 1111 (Okla. 1998); Miller v. Miller, 956 P.2d
887 (Okla. 1998); National Diversified Bus. Servs., v. Corporate Fin. Opportunities, Inc., 946 P.2d 662 (Okla. 1997);
see also Coxv. Kansas City LifeIns.Co.,957 P.2d 1181 (Okla. 1997) (discussing the effect ofajudgment against two
defendants).
21. See First of'Denver Mortgage Investors v. Riggs, 692 P.2d 1358 (Okla. 1984); Rusk v. Independent Sch. Dist.
No. 1 of Tulsa, 885 P.2d 1365 (Okla. 1998).
22. See Drlevich Constr., Inc. v. Stock, 958 P.2d 1277 (Okla. 1998).
23. See Whitehead v. Tulsa Pub. Sch., 968 P.2d 1211 (Okla. 1998).
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over the years.24 It continued to do so this past year in two decisions.' The first
case, Nelson v. Nelson,' concerned an Administrative Rule of the Eleventh Judicial
District that required divorcing parents with minor children to attend an educational
course entitled "Helping Children With Divorce" in order to avoid losing their
visitation rights. When the mother in Nelson served the father with a petition for
divorce, the father decided not to hire an attorney or file an answer, because he
believed the divorce would be settled. In the petition, the wife sought custody of the
couple's two minor children with reasonable visitation rights for the husband.
Nevertheless, the divorce decree, granted by default, denied the father visitation
because he had not attended the course. The Oklahoma Supreme Court found a due
process violation in the lack of adequate notice to the father that his visitation rights
would be affected by failure to attend the course. The supreme court ordered the
default judgment vacated, stressing that due process of law "begins with a party's
right to notice of the pendency of an action and of the nature of any relief sought."27
While the father was properly served, and had notice of the divorce proceedings and
of the requirement to attend the educational course, he was not informed that he
would be denied visitation for failure to attend the course, particularly since the
divorce petition provided for reasonable visitation rights.
The second case, PFL Life Insurance Co. v. Franklin,28 arose out of an
employee's second workers' compensation claim. By the time of the second claim,
the employer had a new insurer who argued that the prior insurer (who was not a
party to the second proceeding) should be liable, because the second claim was
attributable to the same injury for which the employee had received a prior award.
The trial court awarded compensationto the claimant. On appeal, a threejudge panel
of the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals modified the award by adding a reservation
of apportionable liability if the prior insurer was later joined.29 The Oklahoma
Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the rights of the prior insurer could not be
affected until it was named as a party to the instant proceeding. The panel's
reservation of apportionable liability was merely an "impermissible forecast" and a
"legal nullity."3° The Oklahoma Supreme Court explained: "When only one of two
successive employer's carriers stands before the court and the absent insurer lacks
an opportunity to defend its interests, no legal effect may be ascribed to a tribunal's
statement that 'reserves' the absent insurer's potential liability."3' In other words, the
requirements of due process do not allow a court to assert authority over an entity
that is not before it. If the prior insurer were later to be joined as a party, the trial
court would have authority to allocate liability between the two insurers.32
24. See Bomford v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 440 P.2d 713 (Okla. 1968).
25. See Nelson v. Nelson, 954 P.2d 1219 (Okla. 1998); PFL Life Ins. Co. v. Franklin, 58 P.2d 156 (Okla. 1998).
26. 954P.2d 1219 (Okla. 1998).
27. Id. at 1227 (emphasis in original).
28. 958 P.2d 156 (Okla. 1998).
29. See id. at 158.
30. Id. at 161.
31. Id.
32. See id. at 165.
1999]
3
Adams: Developments in Oklahoma Civil Procedure 1997-98
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1998
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals handed down three decisions33 involving
jurisdiction of the small claims court. Title 12, section 1751(A) of the Oklahoma
Statutes34 provides for small claims court jurisdiction over actions based on contract
or tort for the recovery of up to $4,500, exclusive of costs and attorney fees. In
Patterson v. Beall,35 the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals ruled that the small claims
jurisdiction included violations of the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act and in
Phillips v. Seffel, 6 the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals decided that small claims
jurisdiction covered a suit for the recovery of earnest money for breach of contract.
Finally, in Fowler Equipment Co. v. Harry Houston Oil Co.,37 the Oklahoma Court
of Civil Appeals decided that the increase in 1995 in the jurisdictional amount for
small claims court from $2,500 to $4,500 applied to pending cases.
III. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
A number of cases decided by the Oklahoma appellate courts involved statute
of limitations issues. The most interesting and significant of these was Bruner v.
Sobel,38 which was concerned with the savings provision in section 100 of the
Oklahoma Statutes.39 Section 100 allows a plaintiff who has been dismissed from a
previous action other than on its merits to commence a new action within one year of
the dismissal.' The trial court in the Bruner case decided that the plaintiff's second
action was barred by the statute of limitations even though it was filed within one
year of the dismissal of the original action, since the original statute of limitations had
not expired at the time of the dismissal of the original action. The trial court's
decision was based on case law that required the original statute of limitation to have
expired when the original action was dismissed.4 The Oklahoma Supreme Court
reversed, noting a 1975 amendment to Section 100 which had removed that
limitation.4 2 Thus, Oklahoma's one year savings statute applies even if there is still
time remaining on the statute of limitations when the original action was dismissed.
The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals also decided a case involving section
33. See FowlerEquip. Co. v. Harry Houston Oil Co., 945 P.2d 513 (Okla. CL App. 1997); Patterson v. Beall, 947
P.2d 617 (Okla. CL App. 1997); Phillips v. Seffel, 954 P.2d 1257 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998).
34. OKLA.STAT. fit. 12, § 1751 (1991).
35. 947 P.2d 617 (Okla. CL App. 1997).
36. 954 P.2d 1257 (Okla. CL App. 1998).
37. 945 P.2d 513 (Okla. C. App. 1997).
38. 961 P.2d 815 (Okla. 1998).
39. See OKLk.STAT. tit. 12, § 100(1991).
40. See id.
If any action is commenced within due time, and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff is reversed,
or if the plaintiff fail in such action otherwise than upon the merits, the plaintiff, or, if he should
die, and the cause of action survive, his representatives may commence a new action within one
(1) year after the reversal or failure although the time limit for commencing the action shall have
expired before the new action is filed.
Id.
41. See Bruner, 961 P.2d at 817.
42. See id. at 817-18.
[Vol. 34.501
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100. In Pettyjohn v. Plaster,43 it held that the dismissal of the previous action for
failure to state a claim was a judgment on the merits. The Court of Civil Appeals
noted that the phrase "on the merits" has been generally understood to refer to the
substance of a claim or defense, as opposed to purely procedural or technical
grounds. Because a dismissal for failure to state a claim was a decision as to the law
applicable to the case as disclosed in the plaintiff's petition, it constituted a judgment
on the merits. Consequently, the plaintiff could not rely on section 100 to avoid the
running of the statute of limitations.
In many cases, a dismissal or summary judgment may be appropriate because
no factual issue exists concerning a statute of limitations defense. In others, issues
of fact require a trial. For example, in Cortright v. City of Oklahoma City," a fact
at issue was whether the beginning of the 180 day limitation period for the filing of
a tort claims suit was extended by the written agreement of the parties.' The
Oklahoma Supreme Court, accordingly, reversed the trial court's dismissal of the
case. Similarly, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the trial court's dismissal on
statute of limitations grounds in Clements v. ONEOK Resources Co.,6 because an
issue of fact concerning the statute of limitations was presented. Even though the
statutory period had expired, the plaintiffs' allegation that the defendants had
knowingly concealed their failure to pay oil and gas royalty payments had the effect
of tolling the statute of limitation until the plaintiffs learned of the defendants'
misconduct.47 As a result, the plaintiffs raised an issue of fact upon which they
should have been allowed to conduct discovery.'
Purcell v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc.49 concerned the classification of a claim for
purposes of a statute of limitations. The plaintiff in Purcell was a lessor of mineral
interests who brought an action against thelesseeto recover underpaid royalties along
with prejudgment interest. The lessee, arguing that the claim for prejudgment interest
arose out of an oil and gas statute providing for prejudgment interest at twelve
percent for unpaid royalties, 0 maintained that the suit was barred by one of two
statutes. The statutes were: (1) the three year statute of limitations for an action
upon a statutorily-created liability, in the second paragraph of title 12, section 95 of
the Oklahoma Statutes,5 ' or (2) the one year statute of limitations for an action upon
a statute for a penalty codified in the fourth paragraph of the same section.52 The
trial court disagreed, however, and it applied the five year statute of limitations for
breach of a written contract in the first paragraph of that same section .5  The
Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the basis of the lessee's claim was
43. 956 P.2d 948 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998).
44. 951 P.2d 93 (Okla. 1997).
45. See id. at 97.
46. 946 P.2d 1154, 1156 (Okla. 1997).
47. See id. at 1155-56.
48. See id. at 1156.
49. 961 P.2d 188 (Okla. 1998).
50. SeeOKLA.STAT. tit. 52, § 570.10 (1992).
51. OKIA. STAT. tit. 12, §95(1991).
52. Id.
53. See Purcell, 961 P.2d at 189.
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the oil and gas lease, rather than the statute, which merely supplied a measure of
damages for the lessee's breach of contract.5 4
Garrison v. Wood55 also involved choosing a proper statute of limitations. The
plaintiff in Garrison, within one year of his eighteenth birthday, brought an action
against his father to establish paternity and to recover back child support. The father
argued that the claim for child support was barred by the seventh paragraph of title
12, section 95 of the Oklahoma Statutes,56 which requires an action to enforce a
support obligation to be brought before the child reaches the age of eighteen. The
plaintiff contended that the statute of limitations was tolled by section 96 of that title,
which permits a child to bring an action within one year after reaching majority.
Though the trial court ruled in the plaintiff's favor, the Oklahoma Court of Civil
Appeals reversed, holding that the statute specifically concerning actions for child
support controlled over the general tolling provision in section 96."
The equitable defense of laches was examined in Newton v. Newton. 8 The
Newton case arose out of an action to collect back child support. The plaintiff, filing
the action after her new husband had formally adopted the child, sought child support
for the period before the adoption. In response to the defendant's argument that the
claim should have been barred by laches, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals noted
that laches requires an unreasonable delay in enforcing a claim resulting in material
prejudice to the defendant.59 Since there was no evidence of prejudice to the
defendant, the appellate court rejected the defense of laches.
In Hodge v. Morris,6' the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held that a
plaintiff's claim against a third-party defendant must be filed within the normal
limitations period. The plaintiff brought a slip and fall action against the property
owner, who in turn asserted a third-party claim against a craftsman who had been
laying carpet where the plaintiff was injured. After the trial court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment, the third-party defendant moved for
summary judgment on the ground that any claim that the plaintiff may have had
against the third-party was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court
granted summary judgment to the third-party defendant, and the Oklahoma Court of
Civil Appeals affirmed. The appellate court ruled that the plaintiff was reluired to
assert a claim against the third-party defendant in order to proceed against it, and the
plaintiff could not amend the original petition to add the claim against the third-party
defendant after the statute of limitation had run unless the requirements in title 12,
section 2015(C) of the Oklahoma Statutes61 were satisfied.62
54. See id. at 193-94.
55. 957 P.2d 129 (Okla. Ct. App.1998).
56. OKLA. STA. tit. 12, § 95 (1991).
57. See Garrison, 957 P.2d at 130.
58. 956 P.2d 934 (Okla. CL App. 1998).
59. See id. at 936.
60. 945 P.2d 1047 (Okla. CL App. 1998).
61. OK.A.STAT. tit. 12, § 2015(C) (Supp. 1998).
62. See Hodge, 945 P.2d at 1050.
[Vol. 34:501
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IV. ATTORNEY FEES AND INTEREST
Several cases63 from the past year concerned Oklahoma's numerous attorney
fee provisions. The decisions included discussions of entitlement to attorney fees
under various statutes.' Also among the issues addressed were whether opposing
parties may both be entitled to attorney fees as prevailing parties,65 the equitable
doctrine of marshaling, 66 the constitutionality of a one-way attorney fee provision,67
and the authority of a court to order reimbursement of attorney fees that had been
incorrectly awarded.68 In addition, there was one case on the calculation of interest.69
Finally, title 12, section 727 of the Oklahoma Statutes,7" the statute that governs the
award of interest on judgments in Oklahoma state courts, was significantly amended.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in Oneok, Inc. v. Ming,7' analyzed title 12,
section 936 of the Oklahoma Statutes, which provides for the award of attorney fees
to the prevailing party in actions on contracts for labor or services.72 After
successfully defending a federal court action to recover a proportionate share of
drilling costs in connection with a pooling order on a drilling and spacing unit, the
defendant sought attorney fees under section 936. The trial court denied the
defendant's motion for attorney fees. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit certified the
question to the Oklahoma Supreme Court73 pursuant to the Oklahoma certification
statute.74 The Supreme Court ruled that the defendant was entitled to attorney fees
under section 936 because the underlying action had been brought to collect for labor
or services under two contracts that the federal trial court had determined to be
invalid.75
In Midwest Livestock Sys., Inc. v. Lashley,76 the Oklahoma Supreme Court
reaffirmed the principle that both parties may be entitled to an award of attorney fees.
Midwest Livestock was a construction dispute, in which the property owner
successfully sued the contractor for breach of contract, while the contractor, in turn,
foreclosed its mechanic's lien. Finding that each party had prevailed on its respective
claim, the Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that each was entitled to an award of
63. See Midwest Livestock Sys. v. Lashley, 967 P.2d 1197 (Okla. 1998); Oneok, Inc. v. Ming, 962 P.2d 1286
(Okla. 1998); Alford v. Garzone, 964P.2d 944 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998); Ellisonv. Florence, 954 P.2d 1255 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1997); Fugate v. Mooney, 958 P.2d 818 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998); Musser v. Musser, 955 P.2d 744 (Okla. Ct. App.
1997).
64. See Oneok, Inc. v. Ming, 962 P.2d 1286 (Okla. 1998); Ellison v. Florence, 954 P.2d 1255 (Okla. Ct. App.
1997).
65. See Midwest Livestock Sys. v. Lashley, 967 P.2d 1197 (Okla. 1998).
66. See Fugate v. Mooney, 958 P.2d 818 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998).
67. See Alford v. Garzone, 964 P.2d 944 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998).
68. See Musser v. Musser, 955 P.2d 744 (Okla. Ct. App. 1997).
69. See Baker v. Barnes, 949 P.2d 695 (Okla. Ct. App. 1997).
70. OKLA.STAT. tit. 12, § 727 (Supp. 1998).
71. 962 P.2d 1286, 1288-89 (Okla. 1998).
72. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 936 (1998).
73. See Oneok, Inc., 962 P.2d at 1287.
74. See OKA.STAT.tit.20,§ 1602(1991).
75. See Oneok, Inc., 962 P.2d at 1288.
76. 967 P.2d 1197 (Okla. 1998).
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attorney fees from the other.'
The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals in Fugate v. Mooney78 applied the
equitable doctrine of marshaling with respect to satisfying attorney, physician and
hospital liens. The plaintiffs recovered the policy limits of $25,000 from the
defendant's liability insurance, and the policy limits of $35,000 from their
uninsured/underinsured motorist ("UM") insurance. The plaintiffs' medical bills
were in excess of these amounts, and their recovery was also subject to an attorney's
lien of 35% of the recovery. Both the proceeds of the liability and the UM coverage
were subject to the attorney's lien, but only the liability insurance proceeds were
subject to the physician's and hospital's liens for the medical bills. In addition, the
attorney's lien was senior to the physician's and hospital liens. The doctrine of
marshaling applies to cases where a senior lienholder has liens on two funds, and it
requires the senior lienholder to enforce its lien first against a fund in which a junior
lienholder has no interest, before resorting to the fund in which they both have
interests.79 This enables the junior lienholder's interest to be maximized without
affecting the senior lienholder's interest. In the Fugate case, the attorney's lien was
fully satisfied out of the UM proceeds so that the entire amount of the liability
proceeds could be applied to the physician's and hospital liens.
The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals upheld a one-way attorney fees provision
against a constitutional challenge in Alford v. Garzone.0 Alford dealt with the
Protection from Domestic Abuse Act,8' which authorizes an award of attorney fees
if a domestic protective order is granted. 2 After a protective order was denied, the
trial court awarded the defendant attorney fees, but the Oklahoma Court of Civil
Appeals reversed on the ground that the statute provided for an award of attorney fees
only if a protective order was granted. The defendant argued that limiting an award
of attorney fees to successful plaintiffs would violate the Equal Protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Applying a strict scrutiny standard, the appellate court
decided that the one-way attorney fee provision was rationally based because "[ilt
encourages victims [of domestic abuse] to pursue their legal remedies in court without
the threat of attorney fees being awarded should an order not be entered." 3
An apparent conflict between two statutes was resolved by the Oklahoma Court
of Appeals in Ellison v. Florence.4 After obtaining a verdict for damages to timber
under title 23, section 72 of the Oklahoma Statutes, 5 the plaintiffs sought attorney
fees under title 12, section 94086 which provides for an award of attorney fees in an
77. See id. at 1199.
78. 958 P.2d 818 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998).
79. See id.at 819.
80. 964 P.2d 944 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998).
81. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 60.1-60.11 (Supp. 1998).
82. See id. § 60.4(D)(7).
83. Alford, 964 P.2d at 948.
84. 954 P.2d 1255 (Okla. Ct. App. 1997).
85. OKLA.STAT. tit. 23, § 72 (1991).
86. OKLA.STAT. tit. 12, §940(1991).
[Vol. 34.501
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action to recover damages for negligent or willful injury to property. 7 The defendant
argued that the specific statute on timber, which did not provide for an award of
attorney fees, should prevail over the general attorney fees statute."8 The appellate
court ruled that the two statutes could be interpreted in harmony with each other by
allowing attorney fees to be awarded under the general attorney fees statute because
the specific statute on timber did not address the subject of attorney fees.89 It
therefore decided that the plaintiffs were entitled to an award of attorney fees.90
InMusser v. Musser,9 the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals decided that a trial
court had the authority to order reimbursement of attorney fees. After an award of
attorney fees in connection with a divorce was reversed on appeal, the party who
prevailed on the appeal filed an application for the return of fees that had previously
been paid. The trial court denied the request on the grounds that it did not have
jurisdiction over the attorney, because he was not a party. The Oklahoma Court of
Civil Appeals reversed. It concluded that if a court had the power to order payment
of attorney fees, it also had the power to order repayment of the attorney fees if the
attorney fee award was reversed on appeal.92
The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals ruled in Baker v. Barnes,93 that the
defendant in a personal injury case was entitled to a credit for prior payments to the
plaintiff before pre- and post-judgment interest on a judgment were calculated. After
a jury returned a verdict for $200,000, the trial judge deducted payments of nearly
$50,000 from the verdict before calculating pre- and post-judgment interest.9 4
Following Landrum v. National Union Ins. Co.,95 the Oklahoma Court of Appeals
affirmed.9 6 As the supreme court noted in Landrum, allowing the plaintiff to receive
interest on money that the plaintiff had already received would give the plaintiff a
windfall. 97
The 1997 amendments to title 12, section 727 of the Oklahoma Statutes98
resolved an issue concerning the calculation of interest on judgments on which the
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals had been divided.99 Since 1986, the interest rate
on judgments has been tied to the interest paid on United States Treasury Bills, which
has varied from year to year.'00 Before the 1997 amendments, the statute was unclear
87. See Ellison, 954 P.2d at 1256.
88. See id. at 1256.
89. See id. at 1256.
90. See id. at 1257.
91. 955 P.2d 744 (Okla. Ct. App. 1997).
92. See id. at 747.
93. 949 P.2d 695 (Okla. Ct. App. 1997).
94. See id. at 696.
95. 912 P.2d 324 (Okla. 1996).
96. See Baker, 949 P.2d at 697.
97. See Landrum, 912 P.2d at 329-30.
98. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 727 (Supp. 1998).
99. Compare Bohnefeld v. Haney, 931 P.2d 90 (Okla. Ct. App. 1996) (different interest rates apply to each year
from the date of the filing of the action to the verdict) and Burwell v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 896 P.2d
1195 (Okla. Ct. App.1995) (same) with McMullen v. Stevens, 895 P.2d 302 (Okla. Ct. App.1995) (interest rate in
effect at the time of the verdict applies to all of the years from the filing of the action to the verdict).
100. See Og.A. STAT. tit. 12, § 727 (Supp. 1998) (Notice re: Interest on Judgments).
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which interest rate should be used if interest accrued on a judgment in more than a
single year."0' The 1997 amendments clarify that interest is to be compounded each
year so that the rate of interest on a judgment will vary from year to year as the
applicable rate changes."
The 1997 amendments also specify that post-judgment interest begins to accrue
and prejudgment interest stops accruing when "the judgment is rendered."' 3 Because
there may be ambiguity associated with determining the date of rendition of a
judgment, the Civil Procedure Committee of the Oklahoma Bar Association has
proposed another amendment to title 12, section 727.104 Under the Committee's
proposal, the date when post-judgment interest begins to accrue and pre-judgment
interest stops accruing would be the date of filing of the judgment, unless the
judgment expressly states that the operative date is the date the judgment is
rendered.105
V. PLEADING, DISCOVERY AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT
There were a variety of developments concerning the topics of pleading,
discovery and summary judgment, which comprise the pretrial phase of the litigation
process. The Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled in two cases"'6 that the trial court
abused its discretion by denying motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. The supreme court also found another trial court to have
abused its discretion by denying any discovery to a plaintiff on the grounds that the
case was frivolous."0 7 The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals examined the payment
of expert witness fees in connection with discovery in one case"0 8 and the standards
for entering a default judgment as a discovery sanction in another case. 11 Lastly, the
101. See cases cited supra note 99.
102. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §727 (Supp. 1998).
103. Id.
C. The postjudgment interest authorized by subsection A or subsection B of this section shall
accrue from the date as of which the judgment is rendered, irrespective of the date as of which the
judgment is filed with a court clerk or with a county clerk, and shall initially accrue at the rate in
effect for the calendar year during which the judgment is rendered until the end of the calendar
year in which the judgment was rendered, or until the judgment is paid, whichever first occurs.
Id.
104. See OBA Resolutions for 1999 OBA Legislative Program, 69 Okla. BJ. 3740,3745-47 (1998).
105. See id. at 3747.
C. The postjudgment interest authorized by subsection A or subsection B of this section shall
accrue from the earlier of the dateas fwhiel thejudgment is rendered; as expressly stated in the
iudgment or iIrSpti--fl- the datesof which thejudgment is filed with athe court clerk with
aeiuntyeferek and shall initially accrue at the rate in effect for the calendaryear during which the
judgment is rendered until the end of the calendar year in which the judgment was rendered, or
until the judgment is paid, whichever first occurs.
Id.
106. See Brock v. Thompson, 948 P.2d 279 (Okla. 1997); Gaylord Entertainment Co. v. Thompson, 58 P.2d 128
(Okla. 1998).
107. See Floyd v. Ricks, 954 P.2d 131 (Okla. 1998).
108. See McCoy v. Black, 949 P.2d 689,693-94 (Okla. Ct. App. 1997).
109. See Hotels, Inc. v. Kampar Corp., 964 P.2d 933,935 (Okla. Ct. Civ. App. 1998).
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Oklahoma Supreme Court issued three opinions affirming summary judgments,"' in
two of which'.. Justice Opala argued in dissent that the granting of summary
judgment violated the right to jury trial under the Oklahoma Constitution.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court made a dramatic point regarding motions to
dismiss in two related decisions, Brock v. Thompson,"2 and Gaylord Entertainment
Co. v. Thompson."3 Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim are generally
disfavored under the liberal notice pleading standard in the Oklahoma Pleading
Code. 114 Nevertheless, the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided that it was an abuse of
discretion for the trial court in the two Thompson cases to deny the motions to
dismiss. The Thompson cases arose out of lawsuits brought by the same two
plaintiffs in Creek County that attempted to allege defamation claims against the
defendants for letters and newspaper articles in which the defendants advocated the
adoption of initiative measures concerning tort reform. "' The Oklahoma Supreme
Court granted writs of prohibition in the cases to arrest further proceedings in the trial
court because of the failure to state a claim for various constitutional and other
reasons. Noting that a writ of prohibition is not usually granted for denial of a
motion to dismiss," 6 the supreme court decided that it was appropriate where an
appeal would not be adequate to protect "against the chilling effect of a civil action
on fundamental political freedom.""..7
The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals reversed an award of sanctions under
title 12, section 2011' 1 against the plaintiff in Grazier v. First National Bank of
Nowata."9 The appellate court decided that the trial court abused its discretion
because the order imposing sanctions did not specify the conduct that warranted




In addition to several cases ' 2 dealing with discovery issues during the past year,
an amendment was passed to the provision in title 12, section 2004.12 for the
production of documents from third parties by subpoena duces tecum. Since 1993,
section 2004.1 has authorized attorneys to obtain document production from third
parties without having to go through the deposition of a custodian of records or other
witnesses. Although the statute provided for notice of the subpoena to all parties, in
some instances documents have been produced by third parties before opposing
110. See Pickens v. Tulsa Metro. Ministry, 951 P.2d 1079 (Okla. 1997); Weldon v. Dunn, 962 P.2d 1273 (Okla.
1998); Williams v. Tulsa Motels, 958 P.2d 1282 (Okla. 1998).
111. See Weldon v. Dunn, 962 P.2d 1273,1278 (Okla. 1998); Williams v. Tulsa Motels, 958 P.2d 1282,1285-86
(Okla. 1998).
112. 948 P.2d 279 (Okla. 1997).
113. 958 P.2d 128 (Okla. 1998).
114. See Indiana Nat'l Bank v. State Dep't of Human Servs., 880 P.2d 371, 375-76 (Okla. 1994)("Motions to
dismiss are generally viewed with disfavor under this liberal standard...
115. See Brock, 948 P.2d at 282-83; Gaylord, 958 P.2d at 135.
116. See 958 P.2d at 136.
117. Id. at 150.
118. OKI. STAT.ti. 12,§ 2011 (1991).
119. 964 P.2d 950 (Okla. CL App. 1998).
120. See Id. at954.
121. See Floyd v. Ricks, 954P.2d 131 (Okla. 1998); Hotels, Inc. v. Kampar Corp., 964 P.2d 933 (Okla. Ct. App.
1998); McCoy v. Black, 949 P.2d 689 (Okla. CtL App. 1997).
122. OK..A. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004.1 (b)(1) (Supp. 1998).
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parties had an opportunity to assert objections based on privilege, such as the
physician-patient privilege. The 1998 amendment to section 2004.1 seeks to prevent
this from occurring by requiring any subpoena for document production without a
deposition to specify a date for production that is at least seven days after the date of
service of copies of the subpoena on the witness and all parties."'2 In addition, the
subpoena must include language advising the third party not to produce the
documents before the specified date so that the opposing party can have an
opportunity to object to the document production.
Concerning other discovery issues, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the
trial court for denying the plaintiff any discovery in Floyd v. Ricks. 24 The plaintiff
filed an action for breach of contract and bad faith failure to pay a claim against her
uninsured motorist insurer. The plaintiff served interrogatories and document
requests on the insurer, and sought to depose the insurer's claims adjuster. The
insurer objected to the written discovery requests, filing a motion to quash the
deposition notice on the grounds that the lawsuit was frivolous because the plaintiff's
alleged tortfeasor had liability insurance that was significantly greater than the
plaintiff's injuries. Without allowing the plaintiff to conduct any discovery, the trial
court granted summary judgment for the insurer. In ruling that the trial court abused
its discretion in denying the plaintiff's discovery, the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated
that the Oklahoma Discovery Code did not permit a defendant to refuse all discovery
requests on the grounds that a lawsuit is frivolous, and it ruled that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff's discovery."2
In McCoy v. Black,'26 the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals discussed several
issues involving expert witnesses. The expert witness in McCoy was a clinical social
worker, who had been designated by the plaintiff to testify at trial and had also
provided some therapeutic treatment to the plaintiff. After the defendant took the
social worker's deposition, the defendant refused to pay for her time spent in
preparation for and the taking of her deposition on the ground that her opinions were
not expert work product because they were not developed in preparation for trial.
The appellate court acknowledged that an expert whose opinions are based on facts
gathered in the course of treatment, rather than in preparation for trial, is not
considered an expert under title 12, section 3226(B)(3). 27 It affirmed the trial court's
finding, however, that the social worker in the case before it was a hybrid expert,
whose opinions were based both on facts gathered in the course of treatment and
information obtained in preparation for trial." s Because the social worker was a
hybrid expert, it was appropriate for the trial court to order the defendant to pay her
expert witness fees.
A default judgment that was entered as a discovery sanction against a pro se
123. See id.
124. 954P.2d 131 (Okla. 1998).
125. See id. at 134.
126. 949 P.2d 689 (Okla. Ct. App. 1997).
127. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 3226(B)(3).
128. See McCoy, 949 P.2d at 694.
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defendant was reversed in Hotels, Inc. v. Kampar Corporation.29 Stating that
granting a default judgment should be a method of last resort, the Oklahoma Court
of Civil Appeals listed the following five factors that a trial court should consider
before imposing the ultimate sanction for a discovery violation: (1) whether the
violation was due to bad faith; (2) prejudice to the opposing party; (3) whether the
party was given a warning that a discovery violation could lead to a default judgment;
(4) whether less drastic sanctions were considered or ordered before the default
judgment; and (5) the amount of interference with the judicial process that the
discovery violation caused. 3 The appellate court determined after weighing these
factors that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the default judgment.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed several summary judgments in slip and
fall cases.13' The basis for summary judgment in all three cases was that the
dangerous conditions causing the plaintiffs' injuries were open and obvious as a
matter of law. Justice Opala wrote lengthy dissents in Weldon v. Dunn'32 and
Williams v. Tulsa Motels, 3 3 in which he argued that the summary judgments in those
cases violated the right to jury trial under the Oklahoma Constitution.
Summary judgment was reversed in Russell v. Board of County
Commissioners,3 4 a breach of employment contract action brought by a number of
deputy sheriffs to recover overtime and holiday pay. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
ruled that whether the personnel policy handbook created an enforceable contract for
overtime and holiday pay was an issue of fact that precluded summary judgment.
Summary judgment was also reversed in Johnson v. The Black Chronicle,
Inc.,135 a defamation case brought by a public figure against a newspaper. The
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals emphasized that the party who moves for a
summary judgment has the burden of proving that there are no issues of fact. The
appellate court concluded. "Even where a trial judge believes a directed verdict is
required, the judge should ordinarily hear the evidence and direct a verdict rather than
attempt to try the case in advance on a motion for summary judgment.' ' 36
VI. JOINDER OF CLAIMS AND PARTIES
A number of cases presented procedural issues involving the joinder of claims
and the proper parties to an action. These included cases on compulsory
129. 964 P.2d 933,934 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998).
130. See id. at 935-36.
131. See Pickens v. Tulsa Metropolitan Ministry, 951 P.2d 1079 (Okla. 1997); Weldon v. Dunn, 962 P.2d 1273
(Okla. 1998); Williams v. Tulsa Motels, 958 P.2d 1282 (Okla. 1998).
132. 962 P.2d 1273, 1278-84 (Okla. 1998) (Opala, J., dissenting).
133. 958 P.2d 1282, 1285-93 (Okla. 1998) (Opala, J., dissenting).
134. 952 P.2d 492 (Okla. 1997).
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counterclaims,' 37 standing,'38 misjoinder of claims,'39 indispensable parties, 4°
substitution of parties 4 ' and class actions. 42
In Metroplex Properties, L.L.C. v. Oral Roberts University, 43 the Oklahoma
Court of Civil Appeals affirmed a trial court ruling that a number of tort claims
against one defendant were barred, because they should have been asserted as
compulsory counterclaims against that defendant in an earlier action in federal court.
The defendant had previously brought a declaratory relief action against the plaintiff
in which the defendant had obtained a declaration that the plaintiff had failed to
exercise an option to purchase certain real estate owned by the defendant.144 The
plaintiff then filed its state court action alleging that the defendant failed to provide
various documents to the plaintiff during the option period. Finding that the claims
in the second action arose out of the same transaction that was the subject of the prior
federal court action, the Court of Civil Appeals held that they were compulsory
counterclaims which were barred under Rule 13 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.' 45
The Oklahoma Supreme Court examined the issue of taxpayer standing in
Brandon v. Ashworth. 46 When their school district voted to rehire its school
superintendent and entered into a contract with him, a group of taxpayers challenged
the contract as void under the Oklahoma Constitution. 47 The first issue that was
addressed was the standing of the taxpayers to bring the action. Following a long line
of precedents,' " the Oklahoma Supreme Court held in Brandon v. Ashworth that a
taxpayer had standing to bring a declaratory relief action concerning the validity of
a superintendent's contract with a school district. 49 After deciding that the taxpayers
had standing, the supreme court then went on to rule against them on the merits by
holding that the contract with the school superintendent was not in violation of the
Oklahoma Constitution. 50
The Oklaloma Court of Civil Appeals addressed the appropriate remedy for
misjoinder of parties in Watson v. Batton.'5' The plaintiff asserted claims against
two defendants that arose out of two unrelated auto accidents which occurred six
months apart. The trial court found misjoinder of parties and dismissed the action.
137. See Metroplex Properties, L.L.C. v. Oral Roberts Univ., 956 P.2d 926 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998).
138. See Brandon v. Ashworth, 955 P.2d 233 (Okla. 1998).
139. See Watson v. Batton, 958 P.2d 812 (Okla. 1998).
140. See Liberty Bank & Trust Co. v. Perimeter Ctr. Ltd. Partnership, 958 P.2d 814 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998).
141. See In re Estate of King v. Gilbert, 955 P.2d 756 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998).
142. SeeBlackHawkOil Co. v. Exxon Corp.,969 P.2d 337 (Okla. 1998); Greghol Ltd. Partnershipv. OryxEnergy
Co., 959 P.2d 596 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998); Mayo v. Kaiser-Francis Oil Co., 962 P.2d 657 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998).
143. 956 P.2d 926 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998).
144. See id. at 928.
145. See id. at 930.
146. 955 P.2d 233 (Okla. 1998).
147. See id. at 235.
148. Seee.g., Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 445 (1939); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447,480 (1923).
149. See Brandon, 955 P.2d at 235.
150. See id. at 238.
151. 958 P.2d 812 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998).
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The appellate court agreed that the parties were improperly joined in one action,
because the claims against them arose out of two separate accidents. The Oklahoma
Court of Civil Appeals, reversing the dismissal, ruled that the proper remedy was
severance and directed the trial court to proceed separately with two actions.
An indispensable party issue arose in Liberty Bank & Trust Co. of Oklahoma
City, N.A. v. Perimeter Center Ltd. Partnership.52 Applying the criteria for an
indispensable party under title 12, section 2019,' the Oklahoma Court of Civil
Appeals held that Oklahoma City was an indispensable party in a declaratory relief
action which involved the interpretation of a planned unit development that had been
approved by the city council.
The case of In re Estate of King v. Gilbert154 highlighted an important
distinction between a conservator and a guardian. While a guardian may sue in his
own name without joining the ward under title 12, section 2017(A) of the Oklahoma
Statutes,155 a conservator may not be substituted for a ward who is not incompetent
and is the real party in interest.
Three cases 156 involved the Oklahoma class action statute, title 12, section
2023 s7 which is modeled after Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. In two of the
cases, ' the trial courts certified class actions under subparagraph (B)(3) of section
2023. In the third case,159 the trial court denied certification. In all three cases, the
appellate courts found no abuse of discretion.
Black Hawk Oil Co. v. Exxon Corporation,'6° was brought on behalf of a class
of natural gas producers against a plant that purchased natural gas from them and
extracted various by-products from the natural gas. The plaintiffs alleged that the
operator of the plant violated its contracts with the class members by collecting and
selling scrubber oil from the natural gas without accounting for it to them. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court analyzed each of the requirements of paragraph A and
subparagraph (B)(3) and found that they were satisfied.' 6' In particular, the supreme
court decided that the common issues predominated over individual issues because
the provisions in the contracts with the class members that dealt with accounting for
payments to producers used virtually identical language.
62
The class in Greghol Limited Partnership v. Oryx Energy Co.163 consisted of
the royalty and overriding royalty interest owners with respect to an oil and gas unit.
The plaintiffs alleged that the unit operator improperly charged them various costs
152. 958 P.2d 814 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998).
153. OKLA.STAT. tit. 12, § 2019(b) (Supp. 1998).
154. 955 P.2d 756 (Okla. CL App. 1998).
155. OKLA.STAT. tit. 12, § 2017(A) (Supp. 1998).
156. Black Hawk Oil Co. v. Exxon Corp.,969 P.2d 337 (Okla. 1998); Greghol Ltd. Partnership v. Oryx Energy Co.,
959 P.2d 596 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998); Mayo v. Kaiser-Francis Oil Co., 962 P.2d 657 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998).
157. OKLA. SrAT. tit. 12, § 2023 (Supp. 1998).
158. Black Hawk Oil Co. v. Exxon Corp.,969 P.2d 337 (Okla. 1998); Greghol Ltd. Partnership v. OryxEnergy Co.,
959 P.2d 596 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998).
159. Mayo v. Kaiser-Francis Oil Co., 962 P.2d 657 (Okla. CL App. 1998).
160. 969 P.2d 337 (Okla. 1998).
161. See id.at343-44.
162. See id. at 344.
163. 959 P.2d 596 (Okla. C. App. 1998).
1999]
15
Adams: Developments in Oklahoma Civil Procedure 1997-98
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1998
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
in connection with the gathering, treating and processing of the gas produced from the
unit. In affirming the trial court order granting class certification, the Oklahoma
Court of Civil Appeals noted that the standard of appellate review for an order
granting class certification is abuse of discretion. The appellate court also stated that
in close cases, the trial court should grant, rather than deny certification, because the
order may be modified later.'"
The trial court's denial of class certification was affirmed in Mayo v. Kaiser-
Francis Oil Co. 65 The class in the Mayo case consisted of oil and gas interest
owners, who claimed that the defendants conspired to underpay royalties to them
pursuant to a scheme in which the well operator sold its gas production at a contract
rate to a purchaser, who then resold it at a higher rate. The trial court refused to
certify the class, because most of its members were oil and gas interest owners who
did not have any lease agreements with the defendants.'66 Since the requirement of
commonality was lacking, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals ruled that the trial
court did not err in denying class certification.
VII. TRIAL
The Oklahoma Supreme Court resolved an important medical malpractice issue,
regarding the cross-examination of expert witnesses, in Mills v. Grotheer.'67 In
nearly all medical malpractice cases, both the defendant physician and some of the
defendant's expert witnesses will be members of PLICO, the Physicians Liability
Insurance Company of Oklahoma, which provides medical malpractice insurance to
Oklahoma physicians. The plaintiff inMills sought to impeach the defendant's expert
witness by showing the common PLICO membership of the defendant and the expert
witness. While Federal Rule of Evidence 411 prohibits proof of liability insurance
to show negligence, it allows use of liability insurance to show prejudice of a witness.
Following the majority rule among other jurisdictions, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
adopted a "connectedness" test under which a plaintiff would need to establish more
of a connection between the defendant's expert witness and the defendant's liability
insurer than merely being a policyholder or member of the same mutual insurance
company.' 6' The supreme court indicated that imtpeachment should be allowed,
however, if the expert witness was an employee of the liability insurer, a member of
the insurer's board of directors, or on its claims review committee.
The Mills case was followed in Holm-Waddle v. William D. Hawley, M.D.,
Inc.,'69 another medical malpractice case in which the plaintiff unsuccessfully sought
to impeach the defendant's expert witness with membership in PLICO. The Holm-
Waddle case also had a destruction of evidence issue. While the case was pending,
164. See id. at 598.
165. 962 P.2d 657 (Okla. CL App. 1998).
166. See id. at 659.
167. 957 P.2d 540 (Okla. 1998).
168. See id. at543.
169. 967 P.2d 1180 (Okla. 1998).
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the plaintiff died. An expert, hired by the plaintiff's counsel, performed an autopsy.
Before notice of the autopsy was given to the defendant, the plaintiff's body was
cremated. Because the defendant received no notice, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's order prohibiting any use at trial of evidence from the
autopsy. 70
The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals examined the right to jury trial provision
in the Oklahoma Constitution' in State ex rel. Zimmerman v. One Black with
Purple Trim Ford Flareside Truck. 72 The Zimmerman case was a civil forfeiture
action brought against a garage under the Oklahoma Motor Vehicle Chop Shop
Act.'73 The trial court ordered the property forfeited. 74 The property owners
appealed on the ground that the Vehicle Chop Shop Act was unconstitutional because
it did not provide for a jury trial. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals ruled that
the Oklahoma Constitution required a jury trial in forfeiture actions, but the Vehicle
Chop Shop Act was constitutional even though it did not expressly provide for a jury
trial. 7 The appellate court, therefore, reversed and remanded for a new trial by jury.
The restrictions on peremptory challenges required by Batson v. Kentucky 76
were the subject of Rucker v. Mid Century Insurance Co.'" The United States
Supreme Court held in the Batson case that a state prosecutor's use of a peremptory
challenge against a juror because of the juror's race violated the Equal Protection
clause of the United States Constitution. Batson has since been extended to civil
actions, 78 and to peremptory challenges on the basis of gender. 79 While the Batson
line of cases prohibits peremptory challenges on these bases, the burden of showing
discrimination is on the party objecting to the challenge. In the Rucker case, the
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals found no violation of Batson in the peremptory
challenge of two black jurors, because the defendant offered race-neutral reasons for
striking the two jurors.
Under title 12, section 578 8 a party with an objection to a jury instruction is
required to raise it with the trial court promptly after the instructions are given to the
jury in order to preserve the error for appellate review. There is an exception,
though, for plain or fundamental error, which in the context of jury instructions
means that the jury instructions contain an erroneous statement of law that appears
on the face of the jury instructions. Sullivan v. Forty-Second West Corporation8 '
was concerned with the omission of a jury instruction. Although there was no record
that a particular jury instruction had been requested at the trial court, the Oklahoma
170. See id. at 1182-83.
171. OKLA.CONST. art. 2 § 19.
172. 960 P.2d 844 (Okla. Ct. App. 1997).
173. OKLA.STAT. tit. 47,§ 1505 (1991).
174. See Zimmerman, 960 P.2d at 845.
175. See id. at 847.
176. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
177. 945 P.2d 507 (Okla. Ct. App. 1997).
178. See Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
179. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex reL T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
180. OKLA.STAT. tit. 12, § 578 (1991).
181. 961 P.2d 801 (Okla. 1998).
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Court of Civil Appeals found fundamental error because the jury instruction had not
been given. The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed and affirmed the trial court,
largely as a result of the inadequacy of the record and the lack of any clear indication
of the significance of the issue that the missing jury instruction would have
addressed.
182
The Oklahoma Supreme Court ordered a new trial in McMinn v. City of
Oklahoma City18 3 as a result of the trial court's refusal to allow cross-examination
of a party regarding damages. It held that the trial court's denial of cross-
examination was an abuse of discretion.' 84 The supreme court also discussed the law
of the case doctrine, which makes a decision in an appeal binding on all subsequent
stages of the case.185
VIII. CLAIM AND ISSUE PRECLUSION
The Oklahoma Supreme Court decided a record number of cases involving
claim and issue preclusion during the past year. Claim preclusion, formerly known
as res judicata, bars a second action on a claim previously the subject of an earlier
action. The scope of a claim extends to all legal theories and remedies arising out of
an event or transaction that the plaintiff asserted or could have asserted in the earlier
action. Issue preclusion, formerly called collateral estoppel, bars relitigation of an
issue that was actually litigated and determined in an earlier action between the same
parties, whether on the same or a different claim.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court emphasized a basic requirement of either claim
or issue preclusion, that of a final judgment, in In re Estate of Sneed v. Hall.,86
During the course of a probate proceeding, the trial court issued an interlocutory
order severing an exhibit to a will from consideration until after it was determined
whether the exhibit created an inter vivos trust. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held
that until there was a final judgment, claim preclusion did not apply; therefore, the
trial court was free to decide later to incorporate the exhibit into the will.'87
Another basic requirement for claim preclusion is identity of parties between the
second and earlier actions. This requirement was emphasized in Deloney ex. rel.
Deloney.'88 The second action in Deloney was a paternity action brought by a child
by and through her mother to establish paternity and collect child support. The
earlier action was the prior divorce decree between the mother and her former
husband which referred to the child as born of the marriage. The Oklahoma Supreme
Court held that neither claim nor issue preclusion applied because the child was not
182. See id. at 802-03.
183. 952 P.2d 517 (Okla. 1997).
184. See id. at 523.
185. See id. at 523-24. "Decisions made in an earlier appeal are the law of the case as to the issues resolved therein
.... Once an appellate court decision is final, it is binding in all subsequent stages of the case." Id.
186. 953 P.2d 1111 (Okla. 1998).
187. See id.at 1116.
188. 944 P.2d 312 (Okla. 1997).
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a party to the divorce proceeding and therefore could not have been bound by any
determination that was made in that proceeding. 189
An additional limitation on claim preclusion is that the court in the earlier action
must have had jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims presented in the second action.
This limitation is illustrated by Hefley v. Neely Insurance Agency, Inc.'90 After the
plaintiff's claim for Workers' Compensation was denied for lack of coverage, the
plaintiff filed a tort action against the Workers' Compensation insurer, claiming the
insurer was negligent for failure to inform him of the need for a special endorsement
in order to obtain coverage. The Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that neither claim
nor issue preclusion applied, because the parties were different, the issues were
different, and most importantly, the Workers' Compensation Court lacked authority
to try tort and general contract claims.'
An obvious, but essential, requirement for claim preclusion is that the two
actions must both involve the same claim. This requirement was one of the issues in
Miller v. Miller.9 ' The plaintiff in the Miller case brought a tort action alleging
various theories against his former wife and her parents in which he claimed that they
falsely represented that he was the father of the former wife's child. The trial court
found that the action was precluded by the divorce decree, but the Oklahoma
Supreme Court reversed. Although the plaintiff was a party to the divorce decree, the
supreme court decided that claim preclusion did not apply because the divorce and
the plaintiff's tort action did not involve the same claim. They reasoned that divorce
proceedings and tort actions were fundamentally different, since divorce proceedings
seek to end a marriage while tort actions seek damages. 93 The supreme court also
held that issue preclusion did not apply for two reasons. First, the issues in the
divorce and tort actions were different, because of the different relief sought.'9 4 In
addition, the plaintiff was not given a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of
paternity because of the alleged fraud by the defendants. 95
The Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed issue preclusion in three recent cases.
In Hesser v. Central National Bank & Trust Co. of Enid,196 the supreme court held
that issue preclusion did not apply in a legal malpractice action arising out of a
probate proceeding because the issues in the two cases were different. In the prior
probate proceeding, a will drafted by the attorney was challenged for failure to
comply with the applicable statutes. After the will contest was settled, the beneficiary
of the will brought a legal malpractice action against the attorney. The supreme court
ruled that the issue of legal malpractice was not and could not have been decided in
the probate proceeding, 97 because it was outside the scope of the court's probate
189. See id. at 318-19.
190. 954 P.2d 135 (Okla. 1998).
191. See id. at 138.
192. 956 P.2d 887 (Okla. 1998).
193. See id. at 897.
194. See id. at898.
195. See id.
196. 956 P.2d 864 (Okla. 1998).
197. See id. at 869.
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jurisdiction under title 58, section 1 of the Oklahoma Statutes.'98 In addition, because
of the settlement, there was no adjudication of the validity of the will in the probate
action.199
To preclude a party from relitigating an issue, the party must have been given
a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in an earlier proceeding. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court decided that this requirement was not satisfied in Danner
v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc.200 After the plaintiffs were acquitted on larceny
charges, they sued for malicious prosecution and recovered substantial damages. 20'
The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals ruled that the plaintiffs' action was barred by
issue preclusion, because the issue of probable cause had been determined against
them at the preliminary hearing in the prior criminal action. The Oklahoma Supreme
Court reversed the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals and affirmed the trial court by
holding that issue preclusion was not applicable because the plaintiffs were not given
a full and fair opportunity to litigate at the preliminary hearing.2'u The Oklahoma
Supreme Court found that the determination of probable cause at the preliminary
hearing was based on false testimony, and key facts were not and could not have been
discovered before the preliminary hearing. 3 Similarly, the supreme court held in
Miller v. Miller' that issue preclusion did not apply because of the absence of a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the particular issue.' 5
The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that issue preclusion did apply, though, in
National DiversifiedBusiness Services, Inc. v. Corporate Financial Opportunities,
Inc.206 After its first lawsuit for breach of contract was dismissed for lack of personal
jurisdiction because of a forum selection clause, the plaintiff filed a second action
against the defendant for violation of an Oklahoma statute. Although the second
action was ostensibly based on a different legal theory, the second action arose out
of the same contract that contained the forum selection clause.2 7 Since the issue of
lack of jurisdiction had been decided in the first lawsuit, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court decided that the second action was barred by issue preclusion.2 8
The Oklahoma Supreme Court also decided a case that involved the effect of
a judgment against two defendants. In Cox v. Kansas City Life Insurance Co.,209 the
trial court signed a journal entry of judgment for $11 million against an insurer and
$21 million against the insurer's agent. The insurer's liability was based on
respondeat superior, resulting from the actions of its agent. The insurer appealed,
but the agent did not. The Court of Civil Appeals reduced the judgment against the
198. OK..STAT. tit. 58, § I (1991).
199. See Hesser, 956 P.2d at 868.
200. 949 P.2d 680 (Okla. 1997).
201. See Danner, 949 P.2d at 682.
202. See id. at 682.
203. See id. at 683.
204. See Miller, 956 P.2d 887 (Okla. 1998).
205. See id. at 898.
206. 946 P.2d 662 (Okla. 1997).
207. See Nat'lDiversified, 946 P.2d at 668.
208. See id. at 668.
209. 957 P.2d 1181 (Okla. 1997).
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insurer from $11 million to $1.5 million. The plaintiff then attempted to hold the
insurer liable for the $21 million judgment against the agent. The Oklahoma
Supreme Court held that the judgments against the insurer and agent were separate,
even though the insurer's liability was based on respondeat superior, because the
jury's verdict was for separate amounts against the two defendants.2 0 Thus, the $21
million judgment against the agent imposed liability on the agent alone.
IX. POST-TRIAL MOTIONS
Several cases were concerned with post-trial matters. In Wofford v. Mental
Health Services, Inc., the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed an order granting a
new trial on the ground that the order was an abuse of discretion. The supreme court
found no error in the record, and that the trial court had substituted its subjective
views for the jury verdict by ordering the new trial. 2 ' In reaching this conclusion, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court relied on the remarks the trial judge made after the jury
was discharged.
Two cases dealt with motions to vacate judgments. The Oklahoma Supreme
Court held in Stepp v. Stepp,213 that the trial court could modify a consent divorce
decree pursuant to title 12, section 1031.1,214 because the motion to vacate the decree
was filed within thirty days of the entry of the divorce decree.215 Had the motion to
vacate not been filed within thirty days of the entry of the divorce decree, the decree
could have been modified only on the grounds specified in section 1031. In contrast,
Board of Trustees of Town of Davenport v. Wilson216 was concerned with a motion
to vacate a default judgment under section 1031. The Oklahoma Court of Civil
210. Seeid. at l186.
211. 946P.2d 1149 (Okla. 1997).
212. See Wofford, 946 P.2d at 1154.
213. 955 P.2d 722 (Okla. 1998).
214. OKLA. STAT. tiL 12, § 1031.1(Supp. 1998) provides:
A. A court may correct, open, modify or vacate ajudgment, decree or appealable order on its own
initiative not later than thirty (30) days after the judgment, decree or appealable order prepared
in conformance with Section 696.3 of this title has been filed with the court clerk. Notice of the
court's action shall be given as directed by the court to all affected parties.
B. On motion of a party made not later than thirty (30) days after a judgment, decree or
appealable order prepared in conformance with Section 696.3 of this title has been filed with the
court clerk, the court may correct, open, modify or vacate the judgment, decree or appealable
order. If the moving party did not prepare the judgment, decree, or appealable order, and Section
696.2 of this title required a copy of the judgment, decree, or appealable orderto be mailed to the
moving party, and the court records do not reflect the mailing of a copy of the judgment, decree,
or appealable orderto the moving party within three (3) days, exclusive of weekends and holidays,
after the filing of the judgment, decree, or appealable order, the motion to correct, open, modify,
or vacate the judgment, decree or appealable order may be filed no later than thirty (30) days after
the earliest date on which the court records show that a copy of the judgment, decree, or appealable
order was mailed to the moving party. The moving party shall give notice to all affected parties.
A motion to correct, open, modify or vacate ajudgment or decree filed after the announcement of
the decision on all issues in the case but before the filing of thejudgment or decree shall be deemed
filed immediately after the filing of the judgment or decree.
215. See Stepp, 955 P.2d at 725.
216. 953 P.2d 764 (Okla. Ct. App. 1997).
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Appeals held that an attorney's negligence in failing to respond to a lawsuit after the
party was properly served was neither "an irregularity in obtaining a judgment" under
the third paragraph of section 1031 nor an "unavoidable casualty or misfortune,
preventing the party from prosecuting or defending" under the seventh paragraph of
section 1031.217 The appellate court therefore affirmed the trial court's denial of the
motion to vacate the default judgment.218
Two cases involved the enforcement ofjudgments. Drilevich Construction, Inc.
v. Stock219 was concerned with Oklahoma's dormancy of judgments statute?" which
renders unenforceable a judgment on which no execution or garnishment has been
issued for five years after the date of the judgment. The judgment in the DrIlevich
case had been rendered in the State of Washington nearly ten years before it was filed
in Oklahoma under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act.22 1 The
Oklahoma Supreme Court had previously held in First ofDenverMortgageInvestors
v. Riggs22 that the five year dormancy period for a judgment from another state
began to run when the judgment was rendered in the other state, rather than from
when it was filed in Oklahoma. Noting that this represented a minority position, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court decided to overrule the Riggs decision in order to promote
the uniformity of laws with respect to other states. Thus, the five year dormancy
period for a judgment from another state runs from the date the judgment is filed in
Oklahoma, rather than when it was originally rendered.
Gibbs v. Easa,"2 dealt with the imposition of sanctions against a judgment
debtor during post-judgment collection proceedings. The case arose out of a lawyer's
pro se small claims action to collect a fee for legal services. The lawyer claimed that
the judgment debtor violated court orders, altered assets and made false and
misleading statements to the court to avoid collection of the judgment, and the trial
court imposed sanctions more than twice as large as the original judgment. In
reversing, the Oklahoma Supreme Court found no basis for an award of sanctions;
neither under title 12, section 2011'24 which establishes the implications of an
attorney's signature on pleadings, nor for contempt of court under title 21, section
565.1(E),2' nor yet under the inherent authority of the court. Title 12, section 2011
did not authorize sanctions in this case, because there was no paper that the defendant
filed in bad faith." The contempt statute, title 21, section 565.1(E), lacked any
provision for sanctions in the form of an award of attorney fees, and the record in the
case was not sufficient to support an award of attorney fees for bad faith under the
217. Davenport, 953 P.2d at 765.
218. See id.
219. 958 P.2d 1277 (Okla. 1998).
220. OKLA.rSTAT. tit. 12, § 735 (1991).
221. See Drilevich, 958 P.2d at 1278.
222. 692 P.2d 1358 (Okla. 1984).
223. 1998 WL 297671 (Okla. 1998).
224. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2011 (199 1).
225. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 565.1(E) (Supp. 1998).
226. See 1998 WL 297671 (Okla. 1998).
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trial court's equitable powers.22 7
X. APPEALS
The timing of appeals was the subject of Whitehead v. Tulsa Public Schools.2
The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a petition in error may be filed by regular
mail within the appropriate time, instead of by certified mail. Although title 12,
section 99A 29 provides for the filing of an appeal by certified mail with return
receipt requested, the supreme court decided that this requirement was not
jurisdictional. With four Justices dissenting, the Oklahoma Supreme Court overruled
its decision in Rusk v. Independent School District No. 1 of Tulsa.230 The majority
emphasized, though, that the mailing must utilize the United States Postal Service,
and not a private delivery service.2 1
In Tidemark Exploration, Inc. v. Good,22 the Oklahoma Supreme Court
examined the effect of the 1997 amendments to section 990A,23 which were intended
to assure the giving of notice of the filing of a judgment to all parties. Under these
amendments, a copy of a judgment, decree or appealable order must be mailed to all
parties promptly after its filing, and if the court records do not reflect a mailing to the
appellant within three days after the filing of the judgment, the time for filing an
appeal is extended until thirty days after the court records show that a copy of the
judgment was mailed to the appellant. In the Tidemark case, the appealable order
was filed on October 31, 1997, and notice of the filing was mailed to the appellants,
but the appellees neglected to file a certificate of mailing."24 The supreme court ruled
that the time for appeal was not extended on account of the lack of a certificate of
mailing, because the appellants received actual and timely notice of the filing of the
judgment_'25
In Southland Associates v. Clay,26 the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held
that in the event of a conflict between a journal entry signed by the judge and a
minute drafted by the court clerk, the journal entry controls. Accordingly, in the
absence of a showing that the journal entry was dearly erroneous, the judgment as
set forth in the journal entry was affirmed.
An appeal was dismissed in LaRue v. Noble Independent School District No.
40.237 The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals ruled that the appealing parties lacked
standing to appeal, because they were not adversely affected by the trial court's
227. See id. at 5.
228. 968 P.2d 1211 (Okla. 1998).
229. Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 990A (Supp. 1998).
230. 885 P.2d 1365 (Okla. 1994).
231. See Whitehead, 968 P.2d at 1213.
232. 967 P.2d 1194 (Okla. 1998).
233. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 990A (Supp. 1998).
234. See Tidemark, 967 P.2dat 1196.
235. See id. at 1196.
236. 956 P.2d 169 (Okla. C. App. 1998).
237. 946 P.2d 277 (Okla. Ct. App. 1997).
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decision. Another appeal was dismissed in Clark v. State, 8 but for a different
reason. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals decided that the appeal was
premature, because the summary judgment did not resolve all the legal theories in the
case, as is required by title 12, section 994 of the Oklahoma Statutes.2
39
The Oklahoma Supreme Court relied upon the settled law of the case doctrine
in Lockhart v. Loosen,240 and Shoemaker v. Estate of Freeman.24' This doctrine
bears some similarity to claim preclusion, and it bars relitigation of issues that either
have been resolved in an earlier appeal or were not timely raised by the aggrieved
party in an earlier appeal.
X. CONCLUSION
During the past year, the Oklahoma appellate courts decided numerous
procedural issues, ranging from the application of statutes of limitations, to pleading,
discovery, and trial and appellate procedure. Among the significant decisions was
Bruner v. Sobel,242 in which the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the Oklahoma
savings statute applied even though the original statute of limitation had not expired
when the first action was dismissed. Hodge v. Morris243 was another significant
decision where the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held that a plaintiff's claim
against a third-party defendant could not be added by amendment after the statute of
limitations had expired.
The allocation of expert witness fees for time spent in discovery is an issue that
arises frequently in litigation, and the analysis of this by the Court of Civil Appeals
in McCoy v. Blacl' will be of great use. Also of great practical importance was the
supreme court's adoption of the"connectedness test" with respect to the impeachment
of medical expert witnesses in Mills v. Grotheer.245
The large number of cases2' 6 that involved claim and issue preclusion were
particularly noteworthy. These cases demonstrated a number of prerequisites for
these doctrines to come into play, such as: the requirements of finality;247 identity of
parties;' jurisdiction over the claims presented in the second action (for claim
238. 957 P.2d 140 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998).
239. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 994 (1991).
240. 943 P.2d 1074, 1077 n.1 (Okla. 1997).
241. 967P.2d871 (Okla. 1998).
242. 961 P.2d 815 (Okla. 1998).
243. 945 P.2d 1047 (Okla. CL Civ. App. 1998).
244. 949 P.2d 689 (Okla. CL Civ. App. 1997).
245. 957 P.2d 540 (Okla. 1998).
246. See, e.g., Dannerv. Dillard Dep'tStores, 949 P.2d 680 (Okla. 1997); DeloneyexreL Deloney v.Downey, 944
P.2d 312 (Okla. 1997); Hefley v. Neely Ins. Agency, 954P.2d 135 (Okla. 1998); Hesserv. Cent. Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co.ofEnid,956P.2d 864 (Okla. 1998); In re EstateofSneed, 953 P.2d 1111 (Okla. 1998); Millerv. Miller,956P.2d
887 (Okla. 1998); National Diversified Bus. Servs., Inc. v. Corporate Fin. Opportunities, Inc., 946 P.2d 662 (Okla.
1997).
247. See In re Estate of Sneed, 953 P.2d 1111 (Okla. 1998).
248. See Deloney ex reL Deloney v. Downey, 944 P.2d 312 (Okla. 1997).
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preclusion);249 identity of claims (for claim preclusion);"50 identity of issues (for issue
preclusion); 1 and having a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the first action (for
issue preclusion). 52
Important legislative developments occurred, as well. These involved the
calculation of interest on judgments 53 and the subpoenaing of documents from third
254parties.
249. See Hefley v. Neely Ins. Agency, 954 P.2d 135 (Okla. 1998).
250. See Miller v. Miller, 956 P.2d 887 (Okla. 1998).
251. See Hesser v. Cent. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Enid, 956 P.2d 864 (Okla. 1998).
252. See Danner v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 949 P.2d 680 (Okla. 1997).
253. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 727 (Supp. 1998).
254. See id. § 2004.1 (Supp. 1998).
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